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On Ryan’s (2012) theory of wisdom as deep rationality, to believe or act 
wisely is to believe or act in a justifi ed way, informed by a body of other 
justifi ed beliefs about the good life. Ryan (2017) elaborates the view along 
evidentialist lines: one’s belief or act is justifi ed when it is based on the 
best available evidence. The resulting package faces counterexamples. 
Transformative experiences are rational ‘leaps of faith’ (Paul 2014), so 
the agent’s decision to undergo one is not best supported by the evidence 
available. Many transformative experiences (such as deciding to become 
a mother, or choosing a career path) often endow lives with meaning, 
and agents with a sense of purpose (Wolf 2010). Because so much is at 
stake, it is sometimes rational for agents to take on the risk involved in 
transforming themselves. Deciding to undergo such experiences may be 
wise—even if the evidence available at the time doesn’t positively support 
that decision. In reply to this challenge, I argue that, instead of eviden-
tialism, Ryan’s view should include virtue theory, which helps explain 
the seeming counterexamples. I focus on the virtues of openness to experi-
ence, and of steadfastness in the face of experience.
Keywords: Wisdom, rationality, evidence, virtues, transformative 
experiences.
1. Introduction
What is wisdom? Sharon Ryan (2012) has advanced an infl uential 
theory on which wisdom is deep rationality. According to her view, to 
believe or act wisely is to believe or act in a justifi ed way, and informed 
by a body of other justifi ed beliefs about moral, emotional, and practical 
affairs. (These are beliefs needed to live well.) As Ryan (2017) elabo-
rates, to believe or act justifi edly, in turn, is to believe or act based on 
the best available evidence.
Here is a reason in favor of Ryan’s view. The view is intuitively 
compelling because it is procedural. It contrasts with success views, ac-
cording to which being wise presupposes knowledge of how to live well, 
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and enacting that knowledge in actually living well. Success views of 
wisdom fail to accommodate the widely recognized fact that sages can 
fi nd themselves in adverse circumstances, and wisdom may be a “bur-
dened virtue” (Tessman 2005): a virtue that shines through precisely 
when things go wrong. When things go awry, we may still say someone 
acted (or thought) wisely in case they have nothing to reproach them-
selves. That is, they acted (or thought) in a justifi ed way, a way that 
withstands refl ective scrutiny.
In this text, I raise, and then respond to, an important objection to 
Ryan’s view. Ryan (2017) advocates, as part of her view of wisdom, an 
account of rationality as justifi cation, and an evidentialist account of 
justifi cation. The resulting package, I argue, faces important counter-
examples. The counterexamples are some transformative experiences. 
As Laurie Paul (2014) conceives them, transformative experiences are 
rational ‘leaps of faith’. If so, then the agent’s decision to undergo them 
is not best supported by the evidence available in that decision situ-
ation, contra Ryan’s evidentialism. Many transformative experiences 
(such as deciding to become a mother, or choosing a career path) often 
endow lives with meaning, and agents with a sense of purpose (Wolf 
2010). A lot is at stake in deciding to transform oneself. Because so 
much is at stake, it is sometimes rational for agents to take on the risk 
involved in deciding to transform themselves. Deciding to undergo such 
experiences may be wise—even if the evidence available to the agent at 
the time doesn’t positively support that decision.
I respond to this challenge. Ryan’s view of wisdom as deep ratio-
nality shouldn’t be abandoned. But its evidentialist component should 
be renounced. A better companion for Ryan’s deep rationality view of 
wisdom, plus her justifi cation view of rationality, is a virtue theory of 
thinking and acting well. This, I argue, can help explain the seeming 
counterexamples to Ryan’s view coming from transformative experi-
ences. Suppose we take acts and thoughts to be rational inasmuch as 
they exercise skills and virtues their agent possesses. (This is how Za-
gzebski (1996) characterizes justifi cation.) Then deciding to undergo 
transformative experiences—or not—may be rational in many circum-
stances: whenever one appropriately, and carefully, exercises one’s vir-
tues of openness to experience, or, respectively, steadfastness in the 
face of experience. Virtue theory comes to the rescue of Ryan’s view of 
wisdom as deep rationality.
2. Wisdom as deep rationality
In a nutshell, here is Sharon Ryan’s theory of wisdom as deep rationality:
A person S is wise iff (1) S has a wide variety of epistemically justifi ed be-
liefs on a wide variety of subjects that are central to a good liberal arts edu-
cation, as well as morality, practical matters, and matters of the heart, (2) 
S has very few unjustifi ed beliefs and S is sensitive to his or her limitations, 
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and (3) S is deeply committed to learning more about the topics noted in 
(1) and living a life that refl ects what S is justifi ed in believing (2017: 117).
I will articulate, defend, and then respond to an important objection 
to Ryan’s view in what follows. But I start by saying what makes her 
view intuitively compelling. Addressing both support and objections 
will clarify some of the central concepts of Ryan’s view: what it is to 
be rational, what commitment consists it, and how wise thoughts and 
wise deeds cohere.
Ryan’s view of wisdom as deep rationality is well-supported. It does 
justice to the fact that wisdom is most striking in adverse circumstances 
when, even if the sage has nothing to reproach herself, the outcome is 
not ideal. And Ryan’s view also does justice to why the sage’s thoughts 
and deeds cohere (to the extent that they do—which is also the extent 
of one’s wisdom).
The core idea Ryan proposes is that of deep rationality. When is 
rationality deep? Ryan  explains that it:
requires that one be deeply committed to seeking out new ideas, becoming 
more educated, and testing one’s own theories against all of the best evi-
dence available... Furthermore, it requires the wise person to put his or her 
justifi ed beliefs into practice. The theory requires the wise to be deeply com-
mitted to having appropriate emotions, treating others morally, and having 
successful strategies for getting through the trials and tribulations of life, 
etc. (2012: 109)
Ryan’s conception of deep rationality depends on her view of rationality. 
When are thoughts or deeds rational in the fi rst place? As she clarifi es:
I am going to focus on one, purely epistemic, sense of rationality. Epistemic 
rationality should be understood in terms of epistemic justifi cation. I en-
dorse an evidentialist theory of epistemic justifi cation. (2017: 116–17)
That is, beliefs are rational when justifi ed. Acts, presumably, are ra-
tional when the decisions to perform them are justifi ed. To be justifi ed 
is to be best supported by evidence (against countervailing evidence, if 
any there be).
Ryan (2017) lays great emphasis on evidentialism. However, I will 
now argue that this evidentialist construal of justifi cation faces coun-
terexamples: decisions which are not best supported by evidence, but 
which we would ordinarily often deem wise.
3. Transformative experiences
Consider what Laurie Paul (2014) calls transformative experiences: 
becoming a mother, choosing a career path, undergoing surgery to in-
stall a cochlear implant or a sensory substitution system so that one 
may perceive the world differently, undergoing a mystical experience 
of religious conversion, or abruptly quitting an addiction. Sometimes, 
undergoing a transformative experience changes one’s life for the bet-
ter, endowing it with meaning, and the experiencer with a sense of pur-
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pose unsuspected before. In those cases, deciding to transform oneself 
is wise, or so we would ordinarily think. This is despite the fact that 
such decisions cannot be best supported by evidence in their favor. As 
Paul (2014) explains, they often amount to rational leaps of faith.
I will now argue that Ryan’s view of wisdom, coupled with her evi-
dentialism, faces a large class of counterexamples. If wisdom is deep 
rationality, and if rationality is justifi cation, and if justifi cation is evi-
dentialist, then wise thoughts and deeds are, necessarily, those which 
are best supported by evidence. Deciding to undergo transformative 
experiences is sometimes a counterexample to Ryan’s view because we 
often ordinarily deem such decisions to be justifi ed even if they’re not 
based on the best available evidence.
In what follows, I’ll unpack this objection, giving the example of 
deciding to become a mother. If Ryan were right, wisely deciding to 
become a mother would involve deciding it based on the preponderance 
of evidence available to the person expecting. Does that always happen 
when the decision is wise?
As a preliminary to answering this question, consider what kind of 
evidence would be needed. For the purposes of both Ryan’s deep ratio-
nality theory of wisdom, and Paul’s conception of transformative expe-
riences, evidence should be understood in an internalist way. The sage 
manifests deep rationality in foro interno because she is committed to 
being rational: this is an overarching project of hers. Not only should 
one’s beliefs be justifi ed; one’s commitment to their justifi cation should 
make the reasoner able to come with justifi cations herself if prompted. 
Not only should one’s thoughts and deeds cohere; one’s commitment to 
deep rationality entails that the reasoner be able to make that coher-
ence transparent to herself if the question arises. Evidence relevant to 
justifying one’s beliefs or decisions is evidence available internally for 
the agent’s fi rst-personal assessment.1
Does someone who is expecting always have this kind of evidence 
to support her decision? In cases of wise transformative decisions, the 
answer is no. As Paul (2014) describes it, undergoing a transformative 
experience changes our preferences in a way that often cannot be an-
ticipated. One seldom knows beforehand—before giving birth—what 
one’s preferences will be afterwards. When in that position, one can-
not reason one’s way through, starting from preferences prior to giving 
birth, and ending with one’s preferences once one has a child. Suppose, 
for instance, that becoming a mother makes the child come fi rst even 
if you were a party-goer and not much of a family person before. Of-
ten enough, you can’t justifi edly anticipate whether this will happen or 
not at the time when you decide whether you will keep the pregnancy. 
1 It isn’t enough for evidence to exist in favor of holding one’s beliefs or making the 
decisions one makes in order for one to be wise. Rather, the sage has to be sensible to 
that evidence, having some dispositions to accurately detect and weigh evidence. In 
addition to the reason for preferring a virtue-theoretical approach to wisdom given 
in Section 5, this line of thought also supports it.
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Nonetheless, whenever it does occur, the change in preferences involved 
in motherhood is a central part of what one might call a fulfi lling or 
fl ourishing life. Plausibly, the life of a sage may include the joys par-
enthood brings. The experience of becoming a mother might constitute 
what it is for a woman to lead a good life, and her becoming wiser than 
before. Leading to wisdom, the decision itself would be a wise one. But 
that decision would fail to be supported by evidence.
4. Evidence, high stakes, and risk
One might reply to this kind of case by insisting that the decision to 
keep the pregnancy is based on evidence, only not on conclusive evi-
dence. The idea is that, when you decide to keep the baby, you look 
around, see other mothers and other women who decided to terminate 
their pregnancies, read some relevant literature, and decide for your-
self, weighing the pros and cons. True, the evidence you would be gath-
ering is third-personal, and may not apply to you. This is why the evi-
dence is fallible—but it is evidence still. Your decision—to the extent it 
is a wise one—is still based on evidence.2
This reply is in the right direction. Here is what is right about it. 
Often, a pregnant woman has to make this hard choice on scant evi-
dence: third-personal evidence that some mothers are happy and oth-
ers aren’t, and fi rst-personal evidence about her previous behavior, 
more or less suited for societal stereotypes of parenthood. The would-be 
mother has evidence both in favor of, and against, deciding to become 
a mother. How, in these circumstances, would it be rational for her to 
act on evidence that doesn’t settle the matter? And, if not rational, her 
decision can’t be wise either—at least if the deep rationality theory of 
wisdom is correct.
While in the right direction, the reply ignores a crucial fact. Decid-
ing to become a mother often endows the parent’s life with new and 
deeper meaning, and gives the parent a sense of purpose. (Often, not al-
ways.) A lot is at stake in deciding to become a mother. So her decision 
to keep or terminate the pregnancy is a decision with high stakes. The 
most common construal of rational acts is as acts which are performed 
considering what is at stake. So it is rational to commensurate what is 
at stake with what risks the agent can rationally undertake. To wit, if 
a lot is at stake, it is rationally permissible (albeit not compulsory) to 
risk somewhat to get what you want.
Contrast this with evidentialism about how to justify your decisions. 
A decision is justifi ed only if the evidence, on balance, supports it. This 
contrasts sharply with a decision taken by assuming a risk afforded by 
2 It is important to see that the evidence relevant here is that available to the 
agent at the time of making the decision to undergo a transformative experience the 
consequences of which cannot be fully appreciated. What one learns after undergoing 
that experience cannot apply, in hindsight, to decide the diffi cult question of which 
decision should be made.
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the high stakes being decided on. When you risk to achieve something 
you deeply desire—say, the meaningfulness of parenthood—you may 
well do so even when the evidence available to you, on balance, doesn’t 
support that conclusion.3
To sum up, you may decide to become a mother—and that deci-
sion may be wise—even when the evidence does not support that deci-
sion, over and above the countervailing evidence. This line of thought 
doesn’t necessarily undermine evidentialism in general. It does under-
mine evidentialism as an accurate construal of what makes deeds and 
thoughts which underlie wisdom rational. If Ryan’s view of wisdom as 
deep rationality is to be preserved, it has to give up this tenet. What 
can it replace it with? I will suggest that virtue theory is a good replace-
ment as a background theory of rationality.
5. Openness and steadfastness
I will now argue that transformative experiences are no counterexam-
ple to Ryan’s view of wisdom as deep rationality—as long as one holds 
a virtue-theoretical view of what rationality is. The result (e.g., Zagze-
bski 1996) is a picture on which overt acts and mental acts (e.g., coming 
to believe or to desire something new) can be given a unifi ed account 
in point of what makes them rational. Any such performance (overt or 
mental) is rational inasmuch as it exercises a skill or virtue the agent 
has. If what is at stake is practical rationality, the relevant skills will 
be practical and the relevant virtues will be moral (courage, generosity, 
etc.). If what is at stake is theoretical rationality, the relevant skills 
will be cognitive and the relevant virtues will be intellectual (intellec-
tual humility, open-mindedness, etc.) If what is at stake is rationality 
tout court, all such skills and virtues will be relevant.
In this more encompassing sense of rationality, deciding to under-
go transformative experiences may indeed be rational. Which skills 
or virtues would be manifest in transformative experiences, to make 
them rational? Their rationality would be accounted for by the intel-
lectual virtue of openness to experience. Openness unhinged may lead 
to excess, hence to vice—a far cry from what reason would recommend. 
But openness to experiences for which we have good though defeasible 
third-personal evidence that they are signifi cant for achieving a ful-
fi lling life, that kind of openness allows us to see deciding to undergo 
transformative experiences as rational.
3 Note that a friend of evidentialism might instead give up a tenet central to 
Ryan’s deep rationality theory of wisdom, namely, that the rationality of beliefs and 
the rationality of decisions is to be evaluated in the same way. Evidentialists may 
insists their view concerns beliefs alone, not decisions too. Traditional evidentialists 
(e.g., Feldman and Conee 1985) may be construed this way. This reply would be 
to the point because the counterexamples given above all concern transformative 
decisions, not transformative episodes of coming to believe something new.
 A. Mărăşoiu, Wisdom and Reason 373
While a view that relates wisdom and deep rationality has to accom-
modate the wisdom of deciding to undergo transformative experiences, 
it has to also accommodate their exceptional status. And it can do so. 
Part of what Ryan means when she characterizes deep rationality is 
that one’s commitment to self-improvement is deep—in having ratio-
nal thoughts and doing rational deeds. What does such a commitment 
amount to? I think that such a commitment is a manifestation of stead-
fastness, the virtue of not wavering in front of adverse circumstances 
or luring experiences.
When should one be open to new experiences, and when should one 
hold steadfast in resisting them?4 The answer is uniform. We should 
be open to new experiences of which we have good though defeasible 
third-personal evidence that they are (even ever so mildly) signifi cant 
for achieving a fulfi lling life. We should, however, hold steadfast when 
confronted with the prospect of insignifi cant experiences—experiences 
which don’t enhance the meaningfulness of our lives. We should hold 
steadfast for a simple reason: when transformative, experiences are 
risky (who knows who or what I will then become?). And, if they don’t 
enhance the meaningfulness of our lives, the risk comes at no gain and 
should not be taken.5
It goes without saying that one is open to meaningful transformative 
experiences, or steadfast in the face of insignifi cant seemingly transfor-
mative experiences, given what one believes. The sage’s intellectual 
virtues, by leading her to believe what’s right, support her practical vir-
tues in doing what’s right. And, in particular, they support the virtues 
of making the best decision about whether to undergo a transformative 
experience or not—the virtues of openness and steadfastness.
6. Conclusion
I have clarifi ed and amended what I take to be the most promising view 
about the nature of wisdom, that advanced by Sharon Ryan (2012). My 
proposal puts together two ideas I fi nd individually promising, and mu-
tually reinforcing: virtue theory and Ryan’s theory of wisdom as deep 
rationality. My version of Ryan’s view accounts for what makes trans-
formative experiences rational, when indeed they are so: exercising the 
virtues of openness and steadfastness appropriately. It also accounts 
for what commitment is. Commitment is steadfastness in holding on 
to the patterns of thinking and acting that are worth holding on to—in 
light of one’s fi rst—and third-personal evidence.6
4 In delineating these options, I don’t mean to deny the obvious—that one could 
postpone diffi cult choices whenever appropriate.
5 The idea of signifi cance to one’s life (Wolf 2010) is, of course, relative to many 
factors, and the decision to undergo a transformative experience ultimately depends 
on context. But the core idea that the sage should lead a meaningful life seems quite 
intuitive in full generality.
6 Writing this paper was made possible by fi nancial support from the Jefferson 
Scholars Foundation through a John S. Lillard fellowship. I am grateful to an 
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